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Abortion Entitlement: 
Absolute or Qualified? 
J. M. B. Crawford 
Further Light on the Abortion Act of 1967 
from Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees 
and Another (1978). 
Mr. Crawford is editor of Wildy's Texts in Law and Jurisprudence, 
London, England. He calls the Paton case "very disturbing . . . for us 
here, without precedent." He had a long discussion with the judge 
who decided the case, and felt that the matter should be of interest to 
Linacre readers who might compare it to the Danforth case in the U.S. 
The facts of this case, tried in Liverpool by Sir George Baker P., so 
far as stated here have been taken from the judgment in the report, and 
are extremely simple. Thus, I shall try to state them simply, intending 
most of my discussion to consider some of the legal implications of 
this case. 
Mrs. Joan Mary Paton, the second defendant, was the wife of Mr. 
William Paton, and on or about May 8, 1978, was informed by her 
physician that she was pregnant. Subsequent to that knowledge, Mrs. 
Paton decided, under the terms of the Abortion Act of 1967, upon an 
abortion, to which her physician and family doctor, Dr. Macrone, 
expressed no objection. Some introduction of his opinion was intro-
duced into the case at the time of the trial, to which I shall advert in 
this paper. 
The seeking of an abortion by Mrs. Paton disturbed her husband in 
the extreme. Mrs. Paton moved out of the family home on May 16, 
1978, and on the next day her husband, as plaintiff, applied for an 
injunction to restrain both the first named defendant, British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service Trustees, and the second defendant, his wife, from 
obtaining, causing or permitting an abortion to be caused on her. The 
hearing was then adjourned for a week, and heard in court on May 24, 
1978. 
During the first week the husband changed the grounds of his appli-
cation. On May 17 it appears he claimed that his wife, in seeking an 
abortion, was " ... spiteful, vindictive and utterly unreasonable in so 
doing" (688-D), while by May 24, he had withdrawn these allegations, 
and instead was urging the court that "The husband . .. had the right 
to have a say in the destiny of the child he had conceived" (688-D). 1 
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Baker P. was aware of the emotional turmoil which this application 
for an injunction had generated. The press and other news media con-
sidered the case unique in the annals of English law. A ware that moral 
values were at issue, the court nevertheless said: 
I am, in fac t, concerned with none of these matters. I am concerned , and 
concerned only , with the law of England as it applies to this claim. My task 
is to apply the law free of emotion or pred ilection. (688·G). 
The case proceeded through a series of logical moves. The first 
question to be asked by the court was whether the plaintiff did have a 
legal right enforceable in law or equity , to which he made a direct 
reply: No, the plaintiff did not have a right which he could enforce. 
Citing a well known family law case, Montgomery v. Montgomery 
(1965) P46, (1964) 2 WLR 1036, (1964) 2 All ER 22, in which 
Ormrod J cited Cotton LJ, " . .. that the court could only grant an 
injunction to support a legal right ... " (689-C), the court went on to 
ask what would be the nature of the husband 's right in this case, 
stating, " The foetus cannot, in English law, in my view, have a right of 
its own at least until it is born and has a separate existence from its 
mother" (689-F). 
Denying, then, that a fetus had legal rights to be a party to proceed-
ings prior to its birth, the court turned to the status of the putative 
father. Were this a case concerning illegitimacy, which it was not, the 
court believed that the father would have no rights at all (s.l [1] 
Guardianship Act 1973 which does not give parental rights in relation 
to a minor who is illegitimate, per section 1 [7] ). 
The court next referred to the abolition of the action for restitution 
of conjugal rights, saying, 
The law is that the court cannot and would not seek to enforce or restrain 
by injunction matrimonial obligations, if they be obligations, such as sexual 
intercourse or contraception (a non·molestation injunction given during the 
pendency of divorce proceedings could, of course, cover attempted inter· 
course). No court would ever grant an injunction to stop sterilizat ion or 
vasectomy. Personal family relationships in marriage cannot be enfo"ced by 
order of the court (690·G/H). 2 
But suppose somewhere there was a right and, therefore, jurisdiction 
to order an injunction? How could it be enforced by the court? The 
court could not, it said, consider sending -a husband or wife to prison 
if they broke such an order given by injunction. 
At this point the court arrived at its conclusion, stating clearly: 
That, of itself, seems to me to cover the app lication here ; this husband 
canno t by law stop his wife by injunction from having what is now accepted 
to be a lawful abortion within the terms of the Abortion Act 1967 (690·H / 
691-A). 
This was restated a few pages later in the judgment, the court stating 
that the law of England gives him no right to enjoin his wife from 
seeking an abortion, under the terms of the Abortion Act 1967, and 
that of such an application, 
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It follows, there fo re, t hat in m y o pinion this cla im for an injunction is 
complete ly misconceived and mu st be di smissed (692-H / 693-A). 
There are aspects of Paton itself which are interesting; there are also 
extensions of the decision which may compel our interest. I shall first 
consider the case itself. 
A Guide to Trial Tactics 
Looking at the case as a guide to trial tactics one question presents 
itself: Why did the plaintiff change the grounds of his application? On 
May 17, the plaintiff said that his wife (second defendant) did not 
have grounds under the Abortion Act 1967 for a lawful termination. 
If this is alleged, then the court is compelled to review a petitioner 's 
grounds, and, with reference to In re D (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisa-
tion), 3 (cited in the oral argument, but not in the judgment), it per-
mits the court to determine if the provisions for the issue of the 
necessary medical certificate, with its attendant medical reasons, was 
properly complied with . 
However, once the plaintiff had changed the grounds of his applica-
tion, and agreed that the provisions of the Abortion Act of 1967 had 
been properly complied with , one wonders what further argument, qua 
abortion, could have been advanced? The dilemma which the plaintiff 
appears to have created for the court may be expressed in this way: if 
one has a right at law, what then is to stop one from exercising that 
right at law? Do not lawful rights imply lawful remedies, and thus the 
enjoyment of such lawful rights? 
The double burden seems to have been put upon counsel to argue 
something akin to a constitutional conflict question, i.e., to have 
alleged that there existed a hierarchy of legal rights, and then to have 
proceeded to argue that some legal rights, when exercised, take 
precedence:over and negate the exercise of other legal rights. This is a 
difficult ru;gument both in form and in substance. In a state which has 
a written constitution, as does the United States of America, one may 
attempt to argue that certain provisions within that constitution 
deserve (or command even) logical prior consideration and superiority 
to later provisions within that same 'written constitution. How to 
determine precisely when one amendment overrides another amend-
ment will not be an easy task. One may, in a judgment, see the claim 
made that some of the written provisions of the constitution are more 
basic and substantial to the consequent provisions and amendments. 
The form such a legal argument takes is to assert that later constitu-
tional provisions are as a subset within a larger set. A recent case from 
the United States may make clear this notion. 
A reputable journal, The Progressive Magazine, was to publish in its 
May, 1979 edition an article which purported to reveal how a 
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hydrogen bomb could actually be constructed. The United States gov-
ernment sought an injunction to prohibit the pUblication of the 
article. In deciding the case, Federal Judge Robert Warren, of Mil-
waukee, Wis., enjoined The Progressive Magazine (which has a circula-
tion of 40,000 copies each month) from publishing the article, 
grounding his decision on the broad premise that "national security" 
has a greater claim to protection than does the First Amendment right 
to free speech. Morton Mintz, in the March 28, 1979 edition of the 
International Herald Tribune which reported the case, quoted Judge 
Warren as stating: 
If he were to err against t he Progressive, he said , he would seriously injure 
the free press; if he were to err against the government, he might risk the 
"thermonuclear annihilation of us all ." At another point , Judge Warren said, 
"One cannot enjoy freedom of worship, speech and press unless one first 
has freedom to live" (p. 1). 
The case is on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
7th circuit; and, pending an adverse decision there, The Progressive will 
make its ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
But one need not take only constitutional cases as examples of a 
hierarchy of, or suspension of, legal rights. In everyday life we have 
common enough examples from which to draw. If a highway author-
ity needs to conduct repairs on the roadway, the parking bays are 
generally suspended and may not be used by us. Again, though traffic 
is required to negotiate a complete stop at a stop sign, a police car, a 
fire engine, or an ambulance on an emergency call need not stop. The 
necessity of the situation suspends normal rights and duties. 
In Paton the court wanted to know what legal right was to be 
enforced, possessed by or of whom and, if there were a right, how 
then was it to be enforced? 
The court did not examine what the lawful rights of a marriage are, 
in secular law. The court chose to state that it, as a court, could not 
enforce positive duties in a marriage (if they be duties at all). The 
court could not compel sexual concourse; the court could not prevent 
an operation for sterilization or for a vasectomy, ergo, much of 
marital life was a form of communal privacy between the contracting 
parties, and outside of the province of the law, save for specified 
offenses and crimes at common law, or by statute, over which the 
court then has jurisdiction. Is such an analysis, or statement, an ade-
quate statement or analysis of the marital state vis a vis the law? 
There seemed to be something partial about the analysis given by 
the court. What the court appeared to do was to suggest that the core 
concept of a marriage existed in a logical province outside of the law, 
and that many of the positive duties (or what married parties may 
assume to be positive duties) were reciprocities each would have to 
extract from each, much as are good manners or smiles without bene-
fit of law. There were some areas of the marital community which 
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were governed by law, i.e., child support orders, maintenance orders, 
non-molestation orders, and the like. The court had some power to 
review some aspects of a marriage. 
Paton, however, forced the court to view the logic of statutory law 
and its relationship to a marriage. If the Abortion Act 1967 was such 
that it did not contain an .express parental or spousal consent require-
ment, was it then to be assumed that such was implicitly denied by 
the Act? How, then, is the Act to be properly understood and inter-
preted in this regard? One set of textbook authors from 1971 thought 
that the Act was latitudinarian, permitting broad interpretations. 4 The 
difficulty with Paton as to why it would not, or could not, permit 
such a latitudinarian interpretation seemed to rest upon the fact that 
when the plaintiff changed his grounds for injunctive relief, he also 
extinguished hopes for judicial review. If he now admitted that there 
was legal cause for a lawful abortion, then he took the issue out of the 
hands of the court by so changing his trial strategy by admitting that the 
grounds for the abortion were beyond legal review or assessment even. 
Raising a Question 
But there is a question which may be raised. Let us assume that one 
is not arguing a criminal point (about the lawfulness of the proposed 
abortion), but is trying to propound a medical decision. Although the 
court, in Paton, believed that the terms of the Abortion Act 1967 had 
been complied with, one doubts if that position of the court would 
close to any · future court the possibility of a court reviewing the 
grounds for the medical decision for an intended termination under 
the Act. In the instant case, counsel for the plaintiff (at 692-A/B) put 
forward the consideration that there may have been a possible mis-
interpretation or misunderstanding of the force of the medical opinion 
for the second defendant, Mrs. Paton. He suggested that her doctor, 
Dr. Macrone, although expressing no overt disapproval of an abortion, 
did not, however, exprefsly advise one. At this point the court seemed 
to think that for it to investigate whether there had been due com-
pliance with the requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 would, 
somehow, require it, as a court, to undertake a criminal investigation, 
or to conduct itself as a criminal court. With due respect to the court, 
it appears that it may have misdirected itself on this point. Here is 
what the court said: 
This certificate is clear, and not only would it be a bold and brave judge. 
who would seek to interfere with the discretion of doctors acting under the 
Abortion Act 1967, but I think he would really be a foolish judge who 
would try to do any such thing, unless, possibly, where there is a clear bad 
faith and an obvious attempt to perpetrate a criminal offense (692 -C/ D). 
This reasoning deserves some comment. 
The question which one may ask about any action directed under a 
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statute is this: How is one to know (if one is the court) if the statute 
has, or has not, been complied with? The court here is of the mind 
that only bad faith or a criminal attempt are the sole grounds valid for 
investigating the conditions for due compliance with the requirements 
of the Abortion Act. But are they? 
Consider this example. What of the very simple matter of differ-
ences of expert medical opinion? A leading case on this matter is In 
re D (A Minor), which was not a criminal case. The court, neverthe-
less, reviewed the findings and medical opinions of consultants who 
disagreed amongst themselves as to what would constitute the best 
course of medical action for a minor. Why then did the court, in 
Paton, assume that the Abortion Act 1967, which is a statutory crea-
tion in which one may have to determine (at times) if it has been 
legally complied with, was a self-administrating instrument? Why did 
the court seem to think that only a doctor's discretion administered 
the Act? 
It may be objected that even if the plaintiff admitted that narrow 
technical requirements for a lawful abortion had been met, there still 
might have been argued further reasons why the abortion ought not to 
have been granted. I realize that this is to enter into uncharted legal 
ground, containing conceptual difficulties about the legal use of 
"ought" and "is," as well as "can" and "should." But legal reasoning 
should not be dinted by linguistic difficulties; it should strive to solve 
them. 
Let me put forth some cases to consider. 
I may own an automobile which can go a speed of 150 mph in 10 
seconds. But should I drive at that speed? Another case. I may have a 
Golden Credit Card which has no financial limits attached to it; but 
should I then proceed to create a staggering, unlimited debt with it for 
myself? Counsel for the plaintiff in Paton may have been urging these 
kinds of distinctions upon the court, i.e., although the defendant may, 
at law, have complied with the lawful requirements for a prospective 
termination, should she seek the abortion? 
Should Court Review? 
From its written judgment the court seemed to think that once two 
doctors had completed a medical certificate, the matter of any pos-
sible review of what they had proposed ended there. Does it? Why 
should not a court review it if it were urged that one lawful course of 
action, the abortion, might permanently harm another existing lawful 
relationship, the marriage? The Abortion Act 1967 does not expressly 
exclude spousal consent, nor does it expressly include it. But the Act, 
at section 1 (1), does state, " .. . account may be taken of the preg-
nant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment ... . " 
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Does this not give the court wide discretionary powers both at law and 
at equity to consider a woman's actual situation, i.e ., is she married, is 
she unmarried? 
We venture to suggest that a court can be entitled, on application of 
a person with a demonstrable interest - say that a live birth be given 
by a pregnant woman - to require satisfaction, as to due compliance 
with all the provisions of the Act, all conditions precedent to the 
lawful abortion. It would be possible for the expert evidence to be 
tested in cross examination, perhaps even be countered by expert 
evidence in rebuttal. This is not a fanciful suggestion, for in another 
branch of English law we have exactly procedural provisions of this 
kind. In the law of testate and intestate succession, any person 
entitled on an intestacy, by entering a caveat in the same Family 
Division, on taking thereafter such procedural steps as the Rules of 
Court require, can, on a minimum basis, have tested the due execution 
of the will sought to be proved by the executors, in accordance with 
the terms of the Wills Act 1837. The witnesses must go in to the 
witness-box; they can be cross-examined on behalf of the interested 
party, and questioned by the court. On a wider basis, the due execu-
tion can be denied, and evidence adduced in support of such a claim. 
It seems therefore strange that a party with an interest in a live 
birth - we can think of persons other than the husband - should have 
no such procedural rights, as contrasted with persons interested only 
in succession to property. 
In Paton the court said that it could not enforce an injunction 
against a man or a wife. Change those facts. Assuming that Paton were 
a relator action, would it not enforce any injunction granted in the 
event of subsequent breach? Take another example. What if during the 
same case, in a civil action, both parties were excessively rude and 
hostile to the court? Would not the court enforce its powers of con-
tempt of court? Does it not deserve to be asked that if the court had 
found that an abortion was not warranted in Paton, then any doctor 
who thereafter had carried out the abortion would have committed an 
offense under the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861? It would not 
be a case of enacting a criminal penalty as dramatic as sending some-
one to prison; it is simply a fact that no medical practitioner would 
wish to be a party to an abortion to which criminal prosecution might 
attach. It may not be generally known that while this novel case was 
being argued, no private nursing home was willing to permit its facil-
ities to be used for the intended termination sought by the second 
defendant in Paton. All private nursing homes were aware that the 
court has an inherent power to inquire into the proper exercise of an 
administrative action. 
It must be remembered that Paton was a unique case. There did not 
exist many past decisions from which the court could have drawn 
directive principles. The court itself said, 
February, 1980 83 
Nobody suggests that there has ever been such a claim litigated before the 
courts of this country. Indeed , the only case of which I have ever heard was 
in Ontario. It was unreported because the husband's claim for an injunction 
was never tried (688-H). 5 
We had here, then, not a case of stare decisis; rather, the problem was, 
"How to decide?" 
I had said that there were extensions of Paton which should be 
considered because those extensions seem to be contained in the judg-
ment. The first question - and it is somewhat grizzly to consider - is 
this: Are there limits to which a fetus may be subjected to experi-
mentation by its pregnant mother? If a fetus has no rights in English 
law, and if a father may not act in interest of the fetal protection of 
his potential offspring, may then a pregnant woman lend herself with 
impunity, and without fear of legal injunction, to fetal experimenta-
tion which is hazardous, potentially dangerous, a possible cause of 
grave physical damage (as well as brain damage), and in which the 
survival of the fetus without harm to itself is marginal to poor? Could 
a mother now knowingly permit thalidomide experimentation upon 
herself so that a pharmaceutical company might have damaged, 
aborted fetuses upon which to perform experiments? 
Let us compound the facts. Take the same facts and assume that a 
husband now asks his wife to have an abortion, but his wife refuses to 
oblige him. From the holding in Paton, may we assume that if a 
husband knew that his wife was going to permit their unborn child to 
be physically damaged by some novel medical experiment, that the 
court would be forced to sit by helplessly and would permit such 
questionable medical experimentation and whatever possible damage 
to the fetus which would directly ensue, tp be content with stating to 
a petitioning father that his unborn child would gain legal rights in an 
English court only at the time of its birth, and that until then, no 
matter how questionable or vicious might be the medical experimenta-
tion, the unborn would have to suffer the experimentation and be 
content to sue for what harm it has suffered when born? And only 
then? We should remember that even the paper, "The Use of Fetuses 
and Fetal Material for Research" (HMSO, 1972) is an advisory paper 
only, and not law. 
Considering Another Extension 
I wish to consider another extension of Paton. 
The court held that the father has no rights to be consulted in 
respect of a termination of a pregnancy (691-G), and then said, 
True, it (i .e., t he Abortion Act 1967) gives no right to the mother e ither, 
but obviously the mot her is going to be right at t he heart of the matter 
consulting with the doctors if they are to arrive at a dec ision in good faith, 
unless , of course, she is mentally incapacitated or physically incapacitated 
84 Linacre Quarterly 
(unable to make any decision or give any help) as , for example, in conse-
quence of an accident (691-0 /E). 6 
With full respect to the court, this is an odd conjunction of condi-
tions which appears to present serious problems of interpretation, 
taking away what the judgment earlier gave. For instance, if the court 
were presented with any of the conditions mentioned above, what 
would it do in the light of medical differences of opinion regarding an 
abortion, say, of an unconscious mother? This would be a matter 
outside of the province of the criminal law. Would the court feel that 
it could require expert medical testimony to be examined so that it, 
the court, could approve of some course of medical action? One can 
think of a number of examples. What of the pregnant imbecile girl, 
one team of doctors urging an abortion, and another claiming that she 
would be a healthy mother? One could be puzzled by such questions as: 
1. Can the state compel one to have an abortion? 
2. Does an eugenic consideration derive from the Act so that a woman 
who was "mentally incapacitated" or "physically incapacitated" 
might be directed by an order of the court to have an abortion, 
even if against her will (but possibly in her best interests)? 
3. In the matter of guardianship by a husband or by a close relation, 
does such guardianship empower, under the terms of the Act, the 
guardian to request an abortion of the court on the grounds that 
the guardian was acting in the best interests of its charge? 
It would appear that Paton persists in holding that the Abortion 
Act 1967 is possessed of unlimited powers and scope. On the other 
hand, In re D (A Minor) held that medical proposals, findings, and 
opinions are subject to review by the court at all times. Testimony of 
a medical expert may be subject to examination and cross-examina-
tion, and the court may take time to weigh medical evidence to eval-
uate if such proposals are legally permissible. By contrasting Paton 
with In re D (A Minor), both civil cases, have we not a classic instance 
of a conflict of judicial stances, much as one might have of a conflict 
of law under a written constitution, with a hierarchy of legal author-
ities and priorities, one case urging this, another case urging that, 
whatever judicial choice taken, the choices are mutually exclusive? 
Paton seems to foster the belief that only criminal taint or bad faith 
will justify a court reviewing an order for abortion , although even this 
was qualified by the court, saying: 
Even then, of course, the question is whether that is a matter which shou ld 
be left to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney·General 
(692·D). 
Is this not a very strong evidentiary rule, vast in its scope, as well as 
being possibly unduly limiting of the powers of review of any court? 
We do not, I take it, wish to erect a principle which forbids a court the 
right of review during a case. Paton, even if inadvertently so, seems to 
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have foisted such an evidential interpretation and restriction upon the 
court by stating that a review of the reasons underlying the doctor's 
certificate can be undertaken only for a criminal cause, real or sus-
pected. 
A further implication of the judgment in Paton may be with refer-
ence to a theory of law, namely, that statutes, in the language of the 
form of the Abortion Act 1967 which embody permissive clauses for 
action or remedies under the statute and which base such clauses upon 
belief or consent formed by good will, seem to be (or are interpreted 
as being) statutes which are unlimited in scope, application, or restric-
tion. The logical form which such statutes appear to possess is one 
akin to that kind of argument form which states, "If 'p,' then both 'q' 
and 'not-q'." Arguments which embody that logical form are patently 
fallacious because they permit any conclusion to follow from the 
premises. If this is the case - and the logic implicit in the language of 
the Abortion Act 1967 leads me to believe this is so - it would be a 
churlish critic who would fault the court in Paton for having demon-
strated to us this fallacy, however judicially unintended was the 
demonstration. 
I do not wish to suggest that I have solved or met all of the legal or 
jurisprudential problems which Paton may have presented or created, 
but in an area of the law which is so new, one must take risks to ask 
uncommon questions of the possible implications (for the law) of 
novel jUdgments. The Abortion Act 1967 is a little over a decade old, 
and one would be infected with the greatest hubris if one thought that 
a sound, irrefutable body of law, free from all error (venial or serious), 
could be developed in so short a span of time. Even in the United 
States of America, which tends to mix a more vigorous academic 
involvement into its decisions than we are wont to do, the various 
decisions on abortion in that country have met with serious legal and 
academic criticism of disfavor at those decisions. Abortion is a serious 
matter, and it should be guided more by the spirit of law, and less by 
the letter of the law, especially if the letter lacks logically dotted i's 
and crossed t's. 
The good fortune for the legal thinker is that Paton did not 
emanate from the House of Lords. In the face of some of the internal 
logical difficulties in Paton, one doubts if such a case exhausts the 
logic of injunctive remedies or the working of the Abortion Act 1967. 
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suggestion of a criminal abortion nevertheless if doctors did not hold their 
views, or come to their conclusions, in good faith which would be an issue 
triable by a jury . . . then this plaintiff might recover an injunction . That is 
not accepted by Mr. Denny. It is unnecessary for me to decide that aca-
demic question because it does not arise in this case (italics mine) . 
That such a question did not arise is precisely grounds to argue for the position 
that review of the reasons for a lawful termination, urged by attending physicians, 
is within the powers and province of a civil court hearing a case , and it is this 
position which I adopt with regard to Paton. Smith (John), as cited, does not 
preclude such a review by a civil court. 
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